

To:

From: L. Britt Snider

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STATEMENT OF
CRAIG ALDERMAN, JR.
BEFORE
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE

NOVEMBER 20, 1985

IT'S A PLEASURE TO BE HERE THIS MORNING. I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO PROVIDE A PRELIMINARY REACTION BY DOD TO THE STILWELL COMMISSION REPORT. AS GENERAL STILWELL TOLD YOU, THE REPORT WAS BRIEFED TO SECRETARY WEINBERGER YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. THE BOTTOM LINE OF THE SESSION WAS THAT THE SECRETARY ENDORSED THE REPORT IN PRINCIPLE AND AUTHORIZED ITS RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC. IT WILL, IN FACT, BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS TOMORROW. PRINTED COPIES WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR DISSEMINATION TO THE PUBLIC AROUND THE 1ST OF DECEMBER.

HOW DO WE VIEW THE REPORT? CERTAINLY, INsofar AS THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS CONCERNED, IT REPRESENTS SOMETHING OF A MILESTONE. THE LAST REPORT IN THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AREA MADE TO A SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WAS THE REPORT OF THE SO-CALLED COOLIDGE COMMITTEE IN 1956. CHARLES E. WILSON WAS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AT THE TIME.

THE BREADTH OF THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY IS ALSO QUITE UNUSUAL. IT IS RARE THAT A COHERENT SERIES OF RECOMMENDATIONS, ADDRESSING THE SECURITY BUSINESS FROM STEM TO STERN, ARE PRESENTED TO THE SECRETARY AT THE SAME TIME. INDEED, IT PRESENTS, WE BELIEVE, A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE DEPARTMENT TO ADDRESS ITS MOST SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES IN A THOROUGH, COMPREHENSIVE MANNER.

FINALLY, I THINK THE REPORT IS NOTABLE IN TERMS OF ITS REPRESENTING THE UNANIMOUS VIEWS OF SUCH A LARGE AND DIVERGENT PANEL. IN AN AREA AS POTENTIALLY CONTROVERSIAL AS THIS,

ONE WOULD EXPECT A NUMBER OF DISSENTING VIEWS, OR ELSE A REPORT SO WATERED-DOWN TO THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR THAT IT HAS LITTLE IMPACT. BUT THE COMMISSION'S REPORT CONTAINS NO DISSENTS; AND YET CONTAINS MANY EFFICACIOUS PROPOSALS.

IN REACTING YESTERDAY TO THE REPORT, SECRETARY WEINBERGER TOLD THE CHAIRMAN THAT WHILE THERE IS NO PANACEA, NO QUICK FIX, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO DO WHATEVER IT TAKES TO ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. THE SECRETARY ALSO AGREED THAT APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS OF HIS STAFF WOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REPORT. IN MOST CASES, THIS WILL MEAN THAT PERTINENT DoD DIRECTIVES AND INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE REVISED TO INCORPORATE THE CHANGES RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMISSION AND BE STAFFED INTERNALLY. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS WILL ALSO REQUIRE THAT ADDITIONAL RESOURCES BE PROGRAMMED BY AFFECTED DoD COMPONENTS, AND THIS PROCESS MUST BE INSTITUTED IN THE VERY NEAR TERM. FINALLY, SOME OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL REQUIRE INITIATIVES OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT ITSELF, AND THESE, TOO, WILL BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE APPROPRIATE OSD STAFF OFFICE. ALL OF THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN OVERNIGHT, BUT IF THE SAME MOMENTUM IS MAINTAINED, MOST SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED WITHIN THE YEAR. A FEW, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHICH WILL REQUIRE PROGRAMMING SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED RESOURCES, WILL LIKELY TAKE SEVERAL YEARS TO ACCOMPLISH.

BUT THE BOTTOM LINE OF ALL THIS IS THAT WE VIEW THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS GENERALLY AS BOTH DESIRABLE AND FEASIBLE. THEY PROVIDE A LOT OF GRIST FOR OUR MILL, AND WE INTEND TO PRESS FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.

WE ALSO PLAN TO SUBMIT THEM TO THE INTERAGENCY GROUPS ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERMEASURES FOR EVALUATION IN TERMS OF IDEAS THAT MAY BE SUITABLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE.

IS THIS ALL THAT CAN BE DONE? OBVIOUSLY NOT, NOR DO I BELIEVE THE COMMISSION ITSELF CONSIDERS THAT IT HAS COME CLOSE TO PREEMPTING THE FIELD. WE WILL, IN FACT, ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE ON THEM OURSELVES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AS WELL AS COMING UP WITH ADDITIONAL IDEAS TO COMPLEMENT THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS. THIS COMMITTEE, WE RECOGNIZE, IS ALSO IN THE MIDDLE OF DEVELOPING ITS OWN RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS AREA, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING YOUR VIEWS AS WELL.

WITH THIS, I WILL CONCLUDE AND OFFER TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS WHICH YOU MAY HAVE.